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SOLEMNIZATION OF MARRIAGES:
THE COMMON LAW MARRIAGE -NEVER SOLEMN
AND NO LONGER COMMON -WILL IT REMAIN LAW?
JoHN R. WnkMs*
It is often difficult for lawyers to discuss laws relating to marriage
without undue cynicism on the one hand, or inflated pontification on the
other. There are times, however, in the course of legislative or judicial
history when the necessity for change in the law becomes apparent without
the prodding of crusaders, and in spite of the inertia of cynics. A brief
review of the status of ceremonial and common law marriages in Florida
and elsewhere should demonstrate to the most pragmatic observer that
laws relating to marriage can no longer pretend to the solemnity of
regulation while admitting of continuing informality, frivolity, or outright
fraud.
It is a truism recognized by the public and supposedly well ingrained
in the law that while'marriage is a 'contract between two persons, it is
something more. It' is also a status, vitally affecting the public welfare,1
and as a social institution is subject to regulation by public authority. The
state is a party at interest in every marriage contract,2 and the preservation
of the marital relation is deemed essential to the public welfare.3
Pursuant to this fundamental attitude the Legislature of Florida has
enacted a series of statutes of long standing4 purporting to prescribe and
regulate the entry into the marriage relationship. Before a ceremonial
marriage may be entered into, the parties must obtain a license from the
County Judge,5 after making affidavits that they are, over the age of
21 years,' or after producing the sworn consent of their parent in lieu
thereof. No license with or without such consent should be issued where
the male is under the age of 18 years, or the female under 16, unless
both acknowledge under oath that they are the parents or expectant parents
of a child.7 Any County Judge issuing a license without these sworn proofs
of age, and without posting the application for three days8 before issuing
the license, may be guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of $500.00
*Member, Florida Bar; Vice-Chairman, Committee on Family Law.
1. Marsicano v. Marsicano, 79 Fla. 278, 84 So. 156 (1920).
2. Potter v. Potter, 101 Fla. 1199, 133 So. 94 (1931).
3. Gallemore v. Callemore, 94 Fla. 516, 114 So. 371 (1927).
4. FLA. STAT. §§ 741.01-741.22 (1957).
5. FLA. STAT. § 741.01 (1957).
6. FLA. STAT. § 741.04 (1957).
7. FLA. STAT. § 741.06 (1957).8. FLA. STAT. § 741.01 (1957).
9. FLA. STAT. § 741.05 (1957).
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or imprisonment for one year.9 A 1945 amendment10 to the statutes regu-
lating ceremonial marriages requires the parties to obtain health certificates
stating that they are free from venereal disease as a prerequisite to the
issuance of the license.1 ' The certificate is valid for a period of 30 days
after its issuance.' 2 The certificate must be based upon a serological test
administered according to statutory specifications.' 3 A license based upon
such certificate is valid for a period of 30 days.'
After the license is issued, the statutes specify the persons authorized
to solemnize the marriage;' 5 that is, to conduct the ceremony or ritual
whereby the parties manifest their mutual consent to enter into the married
state as husband and wife. Persons so authorized are regularly ordained
ministers in communion with some church, judicial officers of this State,
and notaries public. An exception is made in the case of Quakers, whose
congregations and rites do not encompass a regularly ordained minister.
After the ceremony is performed, the license with a record of the marriage
ceremony is returned to the County Judge, who is required to keep careful
records thereof.'6
These stafiites also declare marriages between white and negro persons
to be absolutely void," and upon conviction of attempting such marriage
provide a penalty of ten years imprisonment or a $1,000.00 fine.'8 No
Judge shall issue a license for such a marriage,' and the penalty for so
doing is two years in prison or a $1,000.00 fine.20 All statutes regulating
ceremonial marriages are applicable to white and negro persons alike.2'
The statutes also prohibit attempted marriages between persons related by
lineal consanguinity, or a sister, aunt, niece, brother, uncle or nephew.22
It would appear from the foregoing cursory glance at this statutory
undertaking of marriage regulation, providing as it does, somewhat stringent
penalties for certain violations, that the policy of the law does in fact
regard the entry into marriage as a serious undertaking, affected with a
legitimate public interest justifying its regulation and control. But the well
known fact is, that all of the statutory requirements set forth above, with
the exceptions of the prohibitions against miscegenation and consanguinity, 23
10. FLA. STAT. §§ 741.051-741.058 (1957); Fla. Laws 1945, ch. 22738,§§ 1-8, at 410.
11. FLA. STAT. § 741.051 (1957).
12. Ibid.
13. FLA. STAT. §§ 741.052-741.054 (1957).
14. FLA. STAT. § 741.058, (1957).
15. FLA. STAT. § 741.07 1957).
16. FLA. STAT. § 741.09 1957).
17. FLA. STAT. § 741.11 1957).
18. FLA. STAT. § 741.12 1957).
19. FLA. STAT. § 741.13 1957).
20. FtA. STAT. § 741.13 1957.
21. FLA. STAT. § 741.17 1957).
22. FLA. STAT. § 741.21 1957).
23. Goldman v. Dithrich, 131 Fla. 408, 179 So. 717 (1938) holding con-
sanguinity as invalidating common law marriage, and stating that a common law
marriage must not be contrary to public policy nor obnoxious to prevailing social mares.




may be totally ignored or attempt to do so, without any statutory or cere-
monial procedures or regulations whatever.
Since a marriage is essentially a civil contract, the essentials of its
formation are the capacity of the parties to contract, and their present
mutual assent to the contract.24 In the ceremonial marriage this present
mutual assent - marriage per verba de presenti - is evidenced by a ritual
performed in the presence of an authorized third person,2 pursuant to
a license.28 But in the absence of a statute either making the performance
of a ceremony after obtaining a license mandatory, or expressly abolishing
common law marriages, the common law rule prevails, whereby the present
mutual assent of the parties is evidenced by cohabitation and repute as
husband and wife.27 Such is the rule presently prevailing in Florida. The
detailed statutes regulating the entry into marriage are deemed to be
directory only, are not mandatory, and do not invalidate common law
marriages.2 8 No interposition by any third person authorized to solemnize
marriages is necessary to the formation of a valid common law marriage.29
Judicial decisions have, however, set minimum requirements for the
establishment of common law marriages. A pre-existing marriage of either
party not terminated by death or divorce is a bar.30 Cohabitation and repute
without words of present assent are not sufficient. 31 Cohabitation with a
promise to marry in the future - marriage per verba de futuro cur copula -
is not recognized in Florida.32 Clandestine or concubinage relations rebut
any presumptions of a valid common law marriage. 33 In the more recent
cases, the Supreme Court of Florida has become increasingly stringent
in setting the evidentiary requirements for their establishment, 4 and indeed
most of the cases wherein it is sought to establish a common law marriage
involve money claims against the estates of wealthy decedents, 3. or claims
for alimony against a wealthy alleged husband,3 rather than the legitimation
of the marital relations of the rural poor or ignorant, as has been supposed
by some, in justification of the common law rule.
24. Marsicano v. Marsicano, 79 Fla. 278, 84 So. 156 (1920).
25. FLA. STAT. § 741.07 (1957).
26. FLA. STAT. § 741.01 (1957).
27. Cams v. Hendrix, 62 Fla. 446, 57 So. 345 (1912).
28. Ibid.
29. Marsicano v. Marsicano, 79 Fla. 278, 84 So. 156 (1920).
30. Maliska v. Dion, 62 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1953); Greene v. Greene, 156 Fla. 342,
22 So.2d 792 (1945).
31. Carretta v. Carretta, 58 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1952).
32. Marsicano v. Marsicano, 79 Fla. 278, 84 So. 156 (1920).
33. LeBlanc v. Yawn, 99 Fla. 328, 126 So. 789 (1930).34. Rothstein, A New Look at Common Law Marriages in Florida, 10 MIAMI L. Q..
87 (1955) and cases cited therein.
35. In re Campbell's Estate, 73 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1954); In re [linger's Estate, 73
So.2d 50 (Fla. 1954); McClish v. Rankin, 153 Fla. 324, 14 So.2d 714 (1943); Goldman
v. Dithrich, 131 Fla. 408, 179 So. 717 (1938); Caras v. Hendrix, 62 Fla. 446, 57
So. 345 (1912).
36. Chaachou v. Chaachou, 73 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1954).
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While the Supreme Court of Florida has manifested the closest judicial
scrutiny of common law marriages, it has properly refused to invade the
province of the legislature to prohibit or otherwise regulate such marriages.
Thus, the evasion of public health standards and other social and spiritual
preparation for entry into marriage cannot be prevented or corrected by
judicial fiat, but is the direct responsibility of the legislature. The Court
has made its attitude abundantly clear in these words:
The thought that there may have been at one stage of the develop-
ment of this country reasons for entering the marriage contract
without the performance of any rite is suggested by an opinion
of one of the civil courts of appeals of Texas. McChesney v.
Johnson, 79 S.W. 2d 658. It was commented in that decision
that sparseness of settlements, difficulty of travel, inaccessibility of
ministers or officers given the right to perform the ceremony and
unfamiliarity, through illiteracy, furnished some justification for
dispensing with the formal marriage vows.
The same considerations, of course, applied to Florida as it
progressed from infancy to its present state of development. These
conditions, however, do not now obtain. Distances to cities have
shrunk because of modem methods of travel; a network of
improved roads and arterial highways has made county seats,
cities and towns accessible to nearly every dweller; churches have
been established galore; and a school system furnishes the advan-
tages of education even to the slothful. Why then, should the
common-law marriage be given the same recognition and dignity
now that Florida has emerged from the status of a frontier?
We can not give any logical reason and although we will not
attempt to abolish it by judicial fiat we will examine the evidence
of such transactions with increasing caution for as the reasons
for making informally a contract of such moment become more
obscure so should the effort to establish it grow more difficult.
This seems harmonious with the trend of late decisions and modern
thought toward the abolition of consensual marriage. 7
It doesn't make any difference whether we approve or disap-
prove of common-law marriages, in this State such marriages are
egal. Once a common-law marriage has been established, it con-
tinues until death or divorce. Several efforts have been made in the
Legislature to abolish common-law marriages and on each occasion,
the Legislature has refused to enact any law abolishing such
marriages. This is a legislative matter and common-law marriages
can only be abolished in this State by the Legislature. 8
37. McClish v. Rankin, 153 Fla. 324, 331, 14 So.2d 714, 717 (1943). Mr. Justice
Thomas delivered the opinion of the court.
38. In re Colson's Estate, 72 So.2d 47, 58 (Fla. 1954). Mr. Justice Mathews delivered
the opinion of the court.
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Although the opinion in McClish Y. Rankin 9 was written in 1943,
the legislature has so far still failed to act. The 1957 session considered
a bill40 which passed the House by a vote of 58 to 28,4 1 but which died
in the Senate Judiciary Committee. 42 This bill, in its final form, would
have specifically abolished common law marriages in this state by the
following language:
Section 1. All marriages termed and known as "common law
marriages" are hereby abolished, prohibited, and barred for any
and all purposes whatsoever in this State, from and after the
effective date of this Act. Provided, nothing herein shall affect
any such marriage recognized as such prior to the effective date
of this Act, or any right, privilege, or benefit arising thereunder.43
It might have preserved the legitimacy of common-law marriages and the
offspring thereof prior to the effective date of the Act. Such a statute
should, however, prescribe a definite effective date at least six months
after passage so as to give notice of the change. The saving clause should
also use words such as "entered into" or "lawfully entered into" in lieu
of "recognized as such." The terms "recognized as such" imply judicial
recognition, and the saving clause in its present form might operate only
in saving such common-law marriages established by litigation prior to
the effective date of the Act. The real purpose of the saving clause is
to protect actually existing unions undertaken prior to the effectiv& date
of the Act, even though the judicial recognition of such unions might
not occur until later. This is the sense of the Illinois Act abolishing
common law marriages in the following language:
. . . all marriages commonly known as "common law marriages"
hereafter entered into shall be and the same are hereby declared
null and void . . 44
An alternative method of abolishing common law marriages would be
by amendment of Section 741.07, Florida Statutes, which authorizes certain
persons to solemnize marriages.45 This statute is at present directory only,4
but could be made mandatory by specifying that all marriages must be
solemnized in the manner thereinafter provided. Such is the type of statute
in effect in New York.' 7 However, a statute expressly abolishing common
law marriages is to be preferred over one attempting to accomplish this
purpose by making solemnization mandatory, because the distinction
between mandatory and directory marriage statutes is useful and should
39. 153 Fla. 324, 14 So.2d 714 (1943)
40. H. R. BILL 41; S. BILL 108, Reg. Sess. (1957).
41. H. R. JouR., Reg. Sess. 139 (1957).
42. S. JOuR., Reg. Sess. 92 (1957).
43. See statute cited supra note 40.
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 89, § 4 (1956).
45. FLA. STAT. § 741.07 (1957).
46. See note 27 supra.
47. N.Y. Doms. REL. LAw ch. 14, § 11.
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be preserved.48 A strictly construed mandatory statute regulating the
licensing and solemnization of marriages might invalidate many cere-
monial marriages entered into in good faith, but subject to technical
or formal defects through no fault of the parties. But the value of a
possible waiver of formal defects should not be confused with tacit or
express approval of common law marriages wherein no ceremonial or
statutory compliance is even attempted. A bill similar to that proposed
to the 1957 Legislature, could, if adopted by the 1959 Legislature,
effectively abolish common law marriages attempted to be contracted
after its effective date, preserve the legitimacy of existing common law
marriages, and also preserve a certain flexibility in sustaining ceremonial
marriages entered into in good faith pursuant to existing directory marriage
statutes.
Legislation securing this objective has not only been favored by the
Supreme Court of Florida, but also by the Florida Bar Committee on
Family Law, 49 and by leading text writers,50 among whom this comment
is typical:
By far the greater number of alleged marriages were meretricious
relationships, for the convenience of the parties alone, and in a
large percentage of the cases the reason no formal celebration of
marriage was had was because one or the other, and in many
cises, both of the parties were already married but separated
from a former spouse. There was nearly always a ghost in the
closet. Moreover, very few, if any, of these pcrsons really believe
that they are married. Scarcely any of these persons believe that
a divorce is necessary to dissolve the marriage; in fact, nearly
all believe that common law marriage and living in adultery are
synonymous terms. If it were a sine qua non to the validity of
such a union that the parties believe that a divorce is necessary
to dissolve such a marriage (and a divorce is necessary as in any
other marriage.), then there are few if any common law marriages.
As is elsewhere shown, however, the parties may doubt the validity
of the marriage and need not consider themselves married 'in
the eyes of the law'. Few of such persons believe that children
of these unions are legitimate. But, says the Supreme Court, a
strong reason for upholding such marriages is to legitimate the
offspring of many parents conscious of no violation of law. The
first part of this statement expresses a noble sentiment but the
latter part borders on the ridiculous. 'Many parents conscious of
48. For a complete discussion of various classes of statutes regulating solemnization
of marriages in the various states, see I VERNIERL, AMERIcAN FAMILY LAWS 103 (1931).
It has been held in at least one jurisdiction that even a "mandatory" statute will not be
construed as abrogating the common law rule, but that such abrogation must be accom-
pished by a statute expressly prohibiting common law marriages. Hoage v. March
ros. Const. Co., 50 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
49. Annual Report, Florida Bar Committee on Fanily Law', 31 FLORIDA BAR
JOURNAL 230(1958).
50. III HOWARD, A 1hs1TORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 184 (2d ed. 1940);
KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE 59 (3d ed. 1946).
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no violation of law' is a phrase which does not sound very well
to one who has had actual experience in the handling of many
of these cases. Again considering the first part of the statement, if
these unions must be held valid marriages in order to render
legitimate the unfortunate children thereof, the children of sub-
sequent formal marriages of the parties must be bastardized. The
great majority of common law marriages so called, are not perma-
nent unions. After a while the parties tire of each other and
'marry' some one else and have children . . .
The State of Florida is today a member of an everdwindling minority
of American states and territories which still recognize common law
marriages. A survey5 2 of fifty-four states and territories conducted by the Navy
Department in 1945 revealed that at that time common law marriages were
recognized in twenty jurisdictions, and were not recognized in thirty-four
jurisdictions. Since 1945, three states, Indiana,55 Michigan 5' and Mississippi 5
have adopted legislation abolishing common law marriages, all three of
them within the last two years. At present, of fifty-four American jurisdic-
tions, thirty-seven do not recognize common law marriages, while seventeen
do. Of the states exclusive of the territories, thirty-four do not accord
recognition, while fourteen do. The survey indicates that since the turn
of the century the states have undertaken the abolition of common law
marriage in increasing numbers.
But opposition to such a reform in this state persists in some quarters
and among members of the legislature. It is said that recognition of
common law marriage aids and protects the poor and the ignorant in their
family relations, and that such persons should not be penalized solely for
a supposed ignorance which renders them incapable of applying for a license
to enter a status which the law and society generally have deemed to be
sacred and vital to the public welfare. This writer is unaware of any such
sympathy or of any such supposed ignorance or incapacity giving rise to
such exemptions in other areas of the law where some regulation by the
state has been deemed necessary. Has any claim yet been made on such
grounds for exemption from filing an income tax return, or from obtaining
51. KOECEL, COMMON LAw MARRIAGE AND ITS DFVELOPMENT IN TIHE UNITED
STATES 101-103 (1922).
52. U.S. NAvY DEPARTMENT, COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM ADMINISTRATION, Family
Allowances, Administrative Policies 15, 15a, 15b (1945). Recognized: Alabama, Alaska,
Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas. Not Recognized: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Canal Zone,Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Phillipine Islands, Porto
Rico, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming.
53. IND. REv. STAT. tit. 44, ch. 1, § 11 (Burns 1958).
54. MICH. PUBLIc LAw No. 44 (1956) (effective Jan. 1, 1957).
55. Miss. CODE ANN. § 465 (1942), as amended, (effective April 5, 1956).
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a driver's license, a fishing license, a hunting license, a liquor license,
or a junk dealer's license, or from proving financial responsibility in operating
a motor vehicle, or from draft registration or military service? Actual
experience in the administration of regulatory statutes governing activities
sometimes trivial in comparison with the marital undertaking certainly
leaves no valid reason today for further procrastination by the legislature
in adopting this long overdue and fundamental reform in the domestic
relations laws of Florida.
